We present a rational theory of reform fatigue. At each instant a politician chooses to divide effort between reforms and the status quo, and this choice is modeled as a two-armed bandit problem. Reforms are expected to yield a higher rate of output to the voter than the status quo conditional on the politician being competent. We interpret competence as the administrative ability to ensure successful implementation of reforms. The politician's competence is therefore unknown ex-ante to both the politician and the voter. In addition the voter is unable to observe the politician's effort on reform, but only observes aggregate output. In equilibrium the voter gives the politician endogenous term lengths that depend on the timing of success. The executive experiments with reforms at the beginning of his first term, but gradually decreases the rate of reforms in the absence of early success. We call this gradual reduction in experimentation reform fatigue. The theory thus predicts that reform fatigue follows a political cycle. We provide empirical evidence of reform fatigue cycles in financial policies among presidential countries.
the original intent, and ensure the successful implementation of the policy. A politician who is competent at reforming must be competent at each stage, and failure to execute may be interpreted as a failure of the reform. An article describing the situation in Greece said
In a wide-ranging review of the Greece program [. . . ] , the I.M.F. found that many of its predictions had failed. There was a sharp fall in imports, but little gain in exports. Public debt overshot original predictions. Predicted revenues from selling public assets were way off. The banking system, perceived as relatively sound at the beginning of the bailout, began having problems as the economy soured. Looking back, the I.M.F. concluded that many errors had been made, including too much emphasis on raising taxes instead of cutting expenses. In addition, the monetary fund overestimated the ability of the government to deliver the changes it was demanding. . . 4 As another example, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was signed into law in 2010 after passing several legislative hurdles, yet it met implementation challenges during the rollout of healthcare.gov, the website largely responsible for delivering insurance made possible by the act. It is reasonable to assume that a newly elected politician will be uncertain that he can be successful along every dimension. The voter will be similarly uncertain.
We take the perspective that effort exerted on implementing reform policies does not deterministically translate into success. An example of reforms that were implemented on paper, but the actual impact was uncertain for some time were Mexico's education reforms implemented in 2013. David Calderon, director of the education reform advocacy group Mexicans First commented on the reform saying, "Of course it's just a change in the rules that still has to be turned into reality". 5 We assume that greater effort on reform translates into a higher probability of success, however effort by an incompetent politician will yield no success on the reform. Effort on reform is typically unobservable to the voter. Much of the work to conduct reforms, for example organizing coalitions and writing legislation is largely unseen to ordinary citizens. Some of this effort can be observed to the interested researcher or reporter, but we argue that the cost of acquiring such information is prohibitive to the average person. Further, when a success is observed by the voter it is not always clear if it was due to the reform or to luck while pursuing the status quo. For example, in the case of IMF suggested financial reforms, if personal incomes rise subsequent to the reform, it may be unclear to the voter if this was due to success of the financial reforms, or a positive income shock.
The problem of reform fatigue is not restricted to the political context. Many organizations require the use of talented individuals that can produce success with relatively high frequency. Much of the economics literature has focused on incentive to select the individual who knows he is talented. However, in many economic situations talent is proved only once the individual is on the job, and thus may not be known with certainty ex-ante to the individual or the organization. Examples include junior faculty at a university, professional athletes, entertainers, and mutual fund managers. In the case of junior faculty, the university would like to encourage junior faculty to take on ambitious projects, but the competence of the junior faculty member in executing such ambitious projects may be unknown to both the faculty member and the university. Many professional athletes enter their careers highly touted but do not "live up to the hype". Yet it takes a coach some time to become sufficiently pessimistic about the athlete's ability to dismiss the athlete. A difficulty common to these settings is identifying and rewarding uncertain talent that can be hard to distinguish from luck, when effort and the source of output is unobservable to the organization. While we find these applications interesting, the problem of retention (without the use of transfers) is most applicable in the context of a politician seeking to engage in reforms, which is what we study. We present a model of reforms in the spirit of the career concerns literature, and introduce experimentation.
6 A politician entering office is either competent or incompetent. Neither the politician nor the voter is certain about the politician's competence at the beginning of his term, and share a common prior belief about the politician's type. We model the politician's choice to conduct reform or pursue the status quo as a two-armed bandit problem. The first arm is the "reform" (or risky) arm, and the second is the "status quo" (or safe) arm. Conditional on the politician being competent, the reform yields a unit of output (or, in the language of the bandit literature, a "success") at a higher rate than the status quo per unit of effort. A divisible unit of effort can be allocated to reform arm or the status quo arm, and the allocation is unobserved to the voter. An observed success on the reform means the politician is competent for certain. The voter will observe if a success occurs (for example voters observe an increase in gross domestic product), but which arm generated the success is unobserved to the voter. The arm that generated the success is observed only by the politician. Thus the voter and the politician learn about the politician's competence gradually, but potentially at different rates.
To simplify the problem we consider an institutional settings in which the voter can commit to a success threshold and grants tenure to the politician if the success threshold is achieved.
7 The voter however, is unable to commit to firing the politician at any given time, 6 Experimentation is modeled as in Keller et al. (2005) . We describe our relationship to this literature in the literature review.
7 One might also think of the tenure reward as the politician's legacy payoff.
and at any moment can fire the politician before tenure is granted.
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The main result is that the politician under-experiments with reforms because experimenting may reveal too much about competence. That is, if a politician exerts the efficient level of effort on reform the voter updates too quickly about the politician's lack of competence in the absence of a success. Thus, by conducting the efficient level of reform (a seemingly good deed), the politician is punished by the voter. As the opening quote by Clare Booth Luce says, 'no good deed goes unpunished'. Some experimentation is always optimal because the politician wishes to signal information about competence if there is a success. A decrease in the level of experimenting with reform to some intermediate level is therefore chosen if no success is observed for some period of time. This reflects the observed reform fatigue. If a success occurs during the period of intermediate experimentation, the voter is uncertain if the success was from reform or the status quo, and the voter's belief about the politician's competence diverges from that of the politician. In this case, the voter may re-elect an incompetent politician with some probability. In equilibrium, the voter gives the politician endogenous evaluation periods, the length of which will depend on the timing of the first success. The voter thus sets an endogenous term limit in equilibrium. This term is decreasing in the time it takes to achieve the politician's first success.
This model delivers the sort of rich dynamics of reforms we see in the data on financial reforms, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 1 gives the average pace of reforms within a politician's term in office (with year 0 as the election year) on a scale from 0 to 100. It shows that, on average, a new politician begins pursuing reforms at the beginning of a term in office, but decreases reforms thereafter. Financial reforms thus follow a political cycle-these reforms are implemented at a faster pace in the year following an election, and at a slower pace in the year prior to an election. The model predicts that, conditional on being close to the end of the term, reforms may increase in response to an increase in output. We see that this is true in the data. Notably, financial reforms are, on average, implemented to a large extent in the long-run. We illustrate the time-trend of financial reforms in Figure 2 .
We show that reform fatigue is present among countries with presidential systems, but not in parliamentary systems. Countries with parliamentary systems, where executives are not elected directly, exhibit no such cycle. This is consistent with our framework, which presumes politicians are directly accountable to voters. We also demonstrate that reform fatigue cycles do not vary significantly when countries are participating in an IMF program. In fact, the fatigue cycle is present among both program participants and non-participants. This is counter to the conventional wisdom that reform fatigue is a phenomenon unique to 
Literature review
There are at least two competing explanations for reform fatigue. One is that the benefits of reform to various constituencies are uncertain and potentially uneven. When information about reforms are revealed and a sufficiently large constituency expects to lose from reforms, they will oppose those reforms. This explanation has been studied by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and more recently by Strulovici (2010) . Another explanation is that there are different types of reforms with varying degrees of difficulty and reformers enact "easy" reforms in the beginning and are simply unable to enact more difficult reforms later on, hence reforms appear to cease. This gradualism in reforms has been explored by Dewatripont and Roland (1992) and Dewatripont and Roland (1995) . Unlike Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) , Dewatripont and Roland (1995) not only consider the ex-ante choices, but the choices of the median voter after the realization of the outcome from initial reforms as the median voter learns about the reform. These explanations are appealing, but we show empirically that reform fatigue follows a political cycle, a prediction absent in these theories.
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This paper is related to the substantial body of political economy research studying political failures first identified by Besley and Coate (1998) . In this paper we investigate when political institutions fail to provide incentives for efficient levels of experimentation on reforms by a politician. A similar question is explored theoretically in Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) and empirically in Canes- Wrone and Shotts (2004) in the context of pandering. Our contribution is to study the evolution of this trade-off between the reform policy and the populist policy throughout a politician's term in office as he learns about his own competence. We show that the politician's incentive to learn about his type induces more effort on reform early in a term, but in the absence of output leads to a decrease in effort on reform and an increase in populist policies.
We study a politician concerned about retaining his position, thus, our paper is related to the large career concerns literature recently summarized by Ashworth (2012) .
10 Our theory is closest to Jackson and Aghion (2014) who also consider the problem of motivating a politician through replacement incentives when there is learning about the quality of the politician. There are two main differences in Jackson and Aghion (2014) . First we include the problem of hidden actions and hidden types, so the choice of the politician and the politician's true beliefs are unobserved to the voter. Second, in our model, the competence of the politician is related to his ability to deliver on reforms, rather than his ability to perfectly observe the random state of the world. There is a large literature on bandit problems in economics including the classic work of Keller et al. (2005) , however, few papers have incorporated moral hazard, and adverse selection.
11 One notable exception is Halac et al. (2013) , which has several differences with the current paper. Halac et al. (2013) are interested in an optimal monetary contract, whereas we are interested in a setting where the voter's only means of creating incentives is to retain or replace the politician. In other words, we consider that wages are fixed, and the "contract" that the voter can offer is a replacement contract -a somewhat blunt tool. 12 Second, in Halac et al. (2013) the politician knows his type prior to beginning the project, hence learning is only about the quality of the project. 13 A small number of authors have applied the tools of the bandit literature to the study of reforms, including Strulovici (2010) . Similar to our work, Strulovici (2010) considered reforms as risky experiments. As mentioned, unlike our work, Strulovici (2010) considers that reforms have heterogeneous effects on voters that are learned over time, and the theory does not predict a reform cycle.
14 There are a significant number of papers studying political cycles, including the seminal works of Nordhaus (1975) and Rogoff (1990) . The political budget cycle is well documented and summarized in Drazen (2001) , and a political aid cycle is documented in Faye and Niehaus (2012) . More recent work in this literature includes Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2004) and Ales et al. (2012) . A common feature is that the cycle studied is an outcome easily observed by the voter and the researcher such as the business cycle. In contrast, we study policies that are not perfectly observable to the voter, and where the output from these policies may also be imperfectly observable.
This paper is the first to empirically document a political reform cycle across countries. With increasing availability of cross-country data on reforms, various papers have examined the relationship between reforms and other outcomes, such as growth, the level of democracy, or labor market performance (e.g., Christiansen et al., 2013; Giuliano et al., 2013; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2005; Feldmann, 2012) . Lora et al. (2003) use survey data for Latin American countries study reform fatigue over two decades. They suggest that one potential reasons for reform fatigue is that the modest economic growth generated from reforms probably fell below expectations. None of these studies focus on electoral cycles.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our stylized model of reforms with experimentation and private information. Section 3 discusses the first best level of experimentation for the voter. Section 4 constructs the MPE with reform fatigue. Section 5 gives the MPE for the case in which the voter cannot commit to a firing policy. Section 6 provides empirical evidence of reform fatigue and Section 7 concludes.
12 See Bowen and Mo (2015) . 13 In this sense, it is closer in spirit to Klein (2012) . However in Klein (2012) there is a single politician, and the voter's objective is to induce the politician to always experiment. In our setting always experimenting is not always optimal for the voter, in some cases the voter would prefer if the politician stopped experimenting.
14 Other contributions to the literature on reforms include Lizzeri and Persisco (2011), Callander and Harstad (2014) .
Model
We present a stylized model of a policy maker choosing reforms versus the status quo under the shadow of electoral incentives. A voter (she) and an incumbent politician (he) interact during the politician's time in office. Time is continuous and the horizon is infinite. The voter and politician discount the future at a common rate r. The politician has a type, which is either competent or incompetent. We denote by θ ∈ {0, 1} the politician's type, where the politician is competent if θ = 1. The politician and the voter share the common prior belief that the politician is competent with probability q 0 .
At every instant that he is in office, the politician must choose to divide one unit of work resource among two tasks, reform and the status quo.
15 If the politician works x units on the reform during a small period [t, t + dt) (and so works 1 − x on the status quo during that same period), the reforms generate one unit of output with probability 1 − e −λrθxdt ≈ λ r θxdt, and the status quo generates one unit of output with probability 1 − e
If a unit of output is generated on either reform or status quo, we say that a success has occurred. The probability of successes are independent across time and tasks. We assume λ r > λ s and q 0 > λ r /λ s . At any instant, the voter can decide to replace the politician. Thus the length of the politician's time in office is endogenous. We assume that, in general, the voter cannot commit to fire or retain the politician at any point in time, thus the voter makes her choice based on the information she has available at the time.
16 When she replaces the politician, the voter gets a lump sum payment λ p /r. We assume λ s < λ p < λ r . 17 In addition we assume that the voter can commit, up front, to a number of successes N after which the politician cannot be replaced -i.e. the politician is granted tenure -If N = ∞, the voter does not commit to giving tenure to the politician.
The voter values successes (only) independently of how they are generated. That is, the voter values output whether it comes as a result of reform, or good luck with the status quo. Each success gives the voter a payoff of 1. She gets zero payoff the rest of the time the politician is hired. The politician gets a flow payoff of 1 per unit of time during the time he is hired.
The politician observes the successes as they occur and observes which task generates 15 Equivalently, in the interpretation of Hörner and Samuelson (Forthcoming), the politician randomizes over the status quo and reform. 16 We consider in Section 5 the case in which the voter can commit. 17 Alternatively, we might consider that when the voter replaces the current politician he has to pay a cost C and gets a new politician with a new type with prior q 0 . For every C > 0, there exists some λ p such that the lump sum λ p /r corresponds to the continuation payoff of getting new politician while incurring replacement cost C. In that sense, the current setting is without loss of generality.
them. The politician's actions are hidden, that is, the voter does not observe how the politician divides his work between the status quo and reform. The voter observes successes, but does not know where they come from. Neither the politician nor the voter observes the politician's type, rather, they learn about it over time.
First best
We present the best solution for the voter if all information is observable, and the voter can dictate the politician's action. In the first best, the voter sets a stopping time T * to replace the politician who has not gotten any success. At any time the politician is hired, the politician should put full effort on reform. The time T * is found by making the voter indifferent between firing the politician at T * or keeping the politician one more instant. Let q t be the politician's belief at t ≤ T * if the politician has not gotten any success. This is given by
The voter's indifference conditions is, to the first order in dt
We summarize the first best in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the first best solution, the politician puts full effort on reform up to some time T * which is given by,
If no success is obtained before T * the politician is removed from office, but if a success is obtained before T * , the politician is retained forever.
We note that the first best can be obtained in an equilibrium if the voter can observe the politician's action. The voter could simply fire the politician before T * if the politician deviates from full effort on reform. Note that since we assume λ p > λ s , the voter prefers to replace the politician rather than have the politician switch to the status quo. Thus with observable actions, the first best is achievable and no reform fatigue is observed. Politicians who do not choose reform, or do not have success on reform sufficiently early are replaced.
There is no conflict of interest between the voter and politician if the myopic threshold belief for the politician, λ s /λ r , is lower than the optimal threshold belief for the voter. Hence, we assume from now on that
which is the necessary and sufficient condition for a conflict of interest to occur.
Markov perfect equilibrium
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria. The state variables are, for the voter, the probability that the politician is competent, and the distribution over the politician's belief. For the politician, the state variables are the voter's state variables, and the probability that he's competent given his own information. An equilibrium is a reform policy χ t : R + → [0, 1] for the politician and a replacement policy Υ t : B → {0, 1} for the voter, where B is the space of beliefs of the voter. Beliefs are updated via Bayes' rule. Note that the politician may have more information than the voter and, as a result, the beliefs of the politician and the voter about the politician's competence may diverge.
In this setting, there exists equilibria in which the politician is never replaced. If the politician puts sufficiently low effort into reforms, then learning will occur sufficiently slowly that the voter will never want to replace the politician. This characterizes all Markov equilibria where the politician never gets replaced. The trivial example is where the politician puts full effort on the status quo at all times. These equilibria do not exhibit reform fatigue, hence, we focus on the class of equilibria in which the politician may be replaced.
We can show that a simple equilibrium exists in which the voter grants the politician tenure after a single success. In this equilibrium, the voter's strategy is to keep the politician if he gets at least one success before some time T . The politician's strategy is to put full effort on reform up to time T , and then switch to the status quo thereafter. Let q T be the politician's belief at time T after using the reform arm up to that time. Then for the voter to have an incentive to fire the politician it must be that H(q T ) < λp r . It must also be the case that q T > λs λr otherwise the politician will want to switch to the status quo before T . Thus for any T such that H(q T ) < λp r and q T > λs λr , it is an equilibrium for the politician to put full effort on the reform up to T and then full effort on the status quo, and the voter fires the agent if there is no success before T .
18 In these equilibria the politician never exerts effort on both the reform and the status quo at the same time, and thus will have no information that is private regarding his type. We are interested in equilibria in which the politician may be replaced, and is able to use his private information about his type. We explore the simplest version of this next.
Equilibrium with replacement
We seek an equilibrium in which the voter replaces the politician with some probability on the equilibrium path and in which the politician uses his private information about his type.
We ask if such an equilibrium exhibits reform fatigue, in the sense of a gradual reduction of effort on reforms. Since the case with one success does not exhibit a gradual reduction, we consider the next simplest case in which the voter commits to giving the politician tenure after 2 successes. We have the following result.
Proposition 2. For N = 2, there exists a unique Markov equilibrium in which the politician is replaced on the equilibrium path with some probability, and this is the best equilibrium for the voter among all Markov equilibria.
The proof of the proposition follows from the construction of the equilibrium. Uniqueness is not to be taken in the strict sense, since after the second success, the politician is indifferent between any action (and not necessarily the optimal one for the voter). We may get a different equilibrium where we replace the politician along the equilibrium path if the politician does not follow what is best for the voter after the second success. The equilibrium is thus unique if we assume the politician will do the best for the voter after the second success.
We describe the equilibrium briefly and then provide a precise construction below. In equilibrium, a politician gets replaced at a timeŤ if no success has occurred beforeŤ . The politician who got a first success at time t ≤Ť will get a length of time ∆ t to get a second success, and if he fails to do so, he gets replaced. If he succeeds, he is hired forever. The equilibrium thus consists of three phases: phase I is before the first success, phase II is after the first success and before the second, and phase III is after the second success. These phases are illustrated below in Figure 3 . We proceed by backward induction, begining with phase III.
Phase III -After the second success
After the second success, the voter's criteria is met and the politician is hired forever and so there is no conflict of interest. In the equilibrium we are looking for, the politician does what is best for the voter when there is no conflict of interest. Let H(q t ) be the voter's , such that below the cut-off it is optimal to put full effort into reform and above the cutoff it is optimal to put full effort into the status quo. The value to the voter after a second success is thus
Phase II -After first success, before second success
After the first success, but before the second success, the politician knows that he is retained forever if he gets a second success. The politician therefore has a myopic incentive to get a second success as quickly as possible, and there is no future benefit from experimentation. If the politician got the first success from the reform, the politician knows that he is competent and will put full effort on reform thereafter. If the politician got the first success on the status quo, the politician does not know that he is competent, and will put full effort on the status quo until the second success.
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Recall that ∆ t is the time the voter has allocated to the politician in which to get a second success conditional on the first success occurring at time t. If the politician was randomizing at the time the first success was obtained, the voter's belief will diverge from the politician's belief. Let τ be the time of the first success and q τ is the politician's belief that the politician is good at time τ . Note that given the conjectured equilibrium, q τ is also the voter's belief that the politician is good at time τ , and is thus known to the voter. Let x τ be the action played by the politician at that time, and (with some abuse of notation) let p t be the voter's belief at time τ + t that the success was obtained on the reform. By Baye's rule we have
Thus at the instant the success is obtained, the voter forms the belief p 0 that the success was obtained on the reform. By Baye's rule, this belief is the the probability of obtaining a success on reform, as a fraction of the total probability of observing a success.
Recall that once the first success is obtained (but before the second success), the politician will put full effort into the reform if the success was obtained from the reform, and otherwise will put full effort into the status quo in equilibrium. Thus as any time t after the first success, the voter is unaware of the politician's actions. Conditional on observing no success, the voter updates the probability that the success was obtained on reform according to
Substituting p 0 into the expression for p t gives
We use these beliefs to derive the politician's effort at any time t. This is summarized in the next lemma.
Lemma 1. If a first success occurs at time τ then the effort exerted on reform at time τ is
We therefore have the effort on reform before the first success x τ as a function of beliefs q τ and the evaluation period for the second success ∆ τ . The next lemma gives the voter's payoffs after the first success.
Lemma 2. If the first success is obtained at time τ , then the voter's expected payoffs on the reform and status quo are respectively
and
Phase I -Before first success Let q t be the politician's belief that he is competent, at time t, before the first success. At all times t ≤T there is no conflict of interest, and the politician will put full effort on reform. If t ≤T then ∆ t = ∞. At all timesT < t ≤Ť there is a conflict of interest. The unsuccessful politician will play action x t ∈ (0, 1). For this intermediate action to be an equilibrium, the politician has to be indifferent between the status quo and reform. This indifference allows us to calculate the politician's dynamic payoff W t at any time t in Phase I.
Lemma 3. The politician's dynamic payoff for a fixed ∆ t is
We calculate ∆ t next. Consider t ∈ (T ,Ť ) when the politician is indifferent between the reform and status quo. If at time t the politician's belief is q t and his continuation payoff is W t , then the equilibrium ∆ t solves
We can show that W 
20 The derivation is analogous to the W S t in the proof of Lemma 3.
We must solve for q t in order to solve (7) for ∆ t . The law of motion for beliefs is q t + q t (1 − q t )λ r x t = 0, where x t is given in equation (3). The boundary condition for q t at time t =Ť is given by what happens at t =Ť , which we solve for next.
Solving for qŤ and ∆Ť We get qŤ as a function of ∆Ť by solving the indifference condition for the politician. Noting that WŤ = 0, we have
We get xŤ as a function of ∆Ť by solving the indifference condition for the voter, to replace the politician atŤ or to wait one instant later. This indifference condition is
where
are the voter's dynamic payoff after a success on the reform and status quo respectively given by equations (10) and (11) respectively. We get
We get ∆Ť by solving the indifference condition for the voter, to replace the politician ať T + ∆Ť or to wait one instant later:
Discussion
To aid the discussion of the equilibrium, we solve the system of equations numerically and obtain results as illustrated below in Figure 4 . The parameter values used in Figure 4 are λ r = 0.3, λ s = 0.1, λ p = 0.15 and r = 1. For these parameter valuesT = .207 andŤ = 1. Thus if a success is obtained beforeT the voter is certain that the politician is good and will keep the politician. That is, ∆ t = ∞. If a success occurs in the interval (T ,Ť ) the voter is still uncertain, but updates his belief In Figure 5 , a success occurs at τ = .34 and, assuming that the politician is good, the politician's belief jumps to 1, but the voter's belief does not jump all the way to 1. Furthermore, the voter's belief will decrease if there is no other success, and the voter is never certain that the politician is good.
Note that in the example of Figure 5 there is under-experimentation. That is, the first best belief at which the politician should be replaced is q T * = 0.20 < qŤ = 0.32. Thus,when there is no commitment, the voter replaces the politician sooner than is optimal in equilibrium assuming no success. This is generally true in equilibria with reform fatigue.
We can increase the starting belief relative to the case in Figure 5 . Since the equilibrium values atŤ do not depend on q 0 , increasing q 0 simply increases the time it takes to reach qT and correspondingly qŤ . Thus increasing q 0 increases the time before which the politician is fired if there is no first success. This is summarized in the next Lemma.
Lemma 4. The time at which the voter fires the politician after no successŤ is increasing in the prior belief that the politician is good q 0 . An increase in the rate of return from the reform λ r is illustrated in Figure 7 . Panel (a) shows that the politician experiments longer with the reform when the rate of return on the reform is higher. Panel (b) shows that the voter also gives the politician more time to implement the reform because the future value of a success on the reform is higher. Intuitively, the belief that the politician is good decreases at a faster rate with a higher value of λ r , because more effort is being exerted on the reform, and the rate of updating is higher.
Lemma 5. If the rate of success on the reform λ r increases, then 1. the effort on reform x t increases; 3. the voter's belief q t decreases.
Commitment
For comparison, we discuss the case in which the voter can commit to the criteria for replacement. One can think of this case as one in which the voter can design an optimal firing policy for the politician, given that the politician will best respond to it at every instant given his information. The voter chooses the firing policy so as to maximize her payoff.
The politician decides at every instant how much to work on the reform (devoting the remaining work resource to the status quo) as a function of his information. The voter decides at the outset the number of successes N ≥ 0 needed for the politician to be kept, and then subsequently at every instant decides to replace the politician or not as a function of her information. If N = ∞, the voter chooses to never commit to retaining the politician.
One success with commitment
The voter can commit to a timeT when to replace the unsuccessful politician. The politician will put full effort on reform at all times when q t > λ s /λ r and will put full effort on the status quo when q t < λ s /λ r ; here q t is the politician's belief that he's competent at time t.
The voter will therefore anticipate this, and will want to hire the politician up until the point where the unsuccessful politician reaches q t = λ s /λ r , then replace the unsuccessful politician. ThusT is the solution to
The voter hires the politician untilT . If the politician gets a success before that, he's hired forever. Otherwise, he is replaced at timeT . Note that in the case with only one success, the politician is replaced sooner that is optimal, ie.T < T * .
Two successes with commitment
We consider the case when two successes are required for the politician to be retained. We have the following result.
Proposition 3. Consider the case with commitment. For N = 2, there exists a unique Markov equilibrium in which the politician is replaced on the equilibrium path with some probability, and this improves the voters payoff relative to the case with no commitment.
The proof of the first part again follows from the construction of the equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the politician puts full effort on reform all the time he is hired. However, the politician is indifferent along the equilibrium no-success path, so he could play any another action.
The politician who has not gotten any success by a timeT (decided optimally by the voter) gets replaced. If the politician gets a success at time t ≤T , the politician gets hired for an additional duration ∆ t , also optimally decided by the voter. If the politician gets no second success during that period, the politician is replaced. Otherwise, the politician is hired forever.
BeforeT . The politician plays action 1, hence his belief is at t ≤T , q t , is
q 0 e −λrt + 1 − q 0 .
Once the politician has obtained a success on the reform, he will play action 1 all the time, no matter the ∆ t decided by the voter. The voter prefers to keep a politician who is competent and knows it as long as possible. Hence, ∆ t should be the maximum possible duration that induces the politician to play action 1 before the first success. If q t ≥ λ s /λ r , so if t ≤T , there is no conflict of interest and the voter can set ∆ t = ∞. If t >T , the value ∆ t makes the politician indifferent between the reform and the status quo arm, so it solves:
where W t is the politician's continuation value at t if he has not obtained any success by that time. Let ∆ t = ∆(q t , W t ) be the solution to the above equation. Conjecture: for any W ∈ [0, 1/r) and any q ∈ (0, λ s /λ r ), the solution exists and is unique. The continuation value of the unsuccessful politician, W t , evolves according to the ODE:
with boundary condition WT = 0. The solution to W t and ∆ t can be found numerically but not in closed form.
AtT . The voter should be indifferent between firing the politician atT , or waiting one instant later. This indifference condition is
where V R (∆T ) is the voter's continuation value at timeT right after the politician got a success from the reform, it can be expressed in closed form
and we also have qT as a function of ∆T from the indifference condition of the politician:
so we get an equation that determines the value of ∆T (and, therefore, of qT andT ). This can be used as initial condition to determine the equilibrium at t <T . As before we solve this system of equations numerically and obtain results as illustrated below in Figure 8 . Figure 8 panel (a) shows that beliefs fall faster in the case of commitment, because more effort is being exerted on the reform. Experimentation is thus higher with commitment and closer to the first best. Figure 8 panel (b) illustrates that the voter gives the politician the same amount of time to get the first success, but gives more time for the second success, once a first success is achieved. As we do not observe sharp decreases in experimentation in practice, we believe the no commitment case is the empirically relevant one, and we take this to the data in the next section. 
Empirical evidence
In this section, we present empirical evidence broadly consistent with the model's predictions. Specifically, from the stylized model, we interpretŤ as the first election after the politician has held office for some time, when they could be potentially replaced. Indeed, for most cases of national elections, this is the time of re-election. AlthoughŤ is endogenous in the model, elections around the world typically occur after a fixed number of years as determined by the country's constitution. 21 The theory generates two key predictions with regards to the pattern of reform effort in the period up toŤ . First, as demonstrated in Figure 4 , before the first success, there is a general pattern of reform fatigue. From the time the politician takes office to the end of his term atŤ , reform effort is non-increasing, even if the pace of decline may vary. Second, based on our analysis of Phase II (after first success, before second success), if there a success is observed beforeŤ , the politician will exert full effort on reform thereafter if he achieves a success on the reform, as illustrated in Figure 5 . Thus, we expect the reform fatigue pattern to be reversed if a success is observed, or in other words, if output growth is generated.
Data
We document reform cycles using country-level reduced form regressions. 22 To do so, three key pieces of information are required: a measure of reforms which impact the economy and are unobserved to the voter, election years, and (per capita) output. All are observed at annual frequency. The measure of reforms used is a market liberalization index for the financial sector. We study financial reforms for three reasons. First, much of the qualitative debate and anecdotal accounts of reform fatigue have focused on reforms within the financial sector. Second, financial reforms are typically implemented by an executive and it requires effort to build coalitions to pass legislation and write the text of the legislation. This effort of the politician is arguably unobserved to the voter, as they are complicated to implement, requiring reasonably sophisticated legislation and implementation. Third, the positive economic impact of financial reforms is supported by empirical results from, for instance, Prati et al. (2013) and Christiansen et al. (2013) .
23 Thus, We utilize data on financial reforms from Abiad et al. (2008) , which covers 91 countries over the 1973-2005 period. The financial sector is analyzed along seven different dimensions, which is then combined into an aggregate index. We rescale this index to be between 0 and 100. 24 . We analyze the change in this financial reforms index, as measured by the annual first difference of this outcome variable. The main source for national elections data is the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (DPI). This database records years in which an executive or legislative election take place for the cross-national sample over the 1975-2012 period. It also differentiates between three political systems: parliamentary, assembly-elected president, and presidential. Our analysis will be limited to presidential systems, in which the head of the executive branch is elected either directly or by an electoral college (whose only function is to elect the president). The executive leader is thus directly accountable to voters, without a parliament playing an intermediary role.
25 Our regression sample covers the period from 1976 to 2004
and 56 countries (see Appendix A for a list).
In the model, one unit of output is generated with some probability. Empirically, we employ a standard measure of per capita output growth by computing growth rates using data on GDP per capita from the Penn World Tables 7.0 (PWT). 26 To capture the binary reforms do have economic impact as they are positively associated with output growth. Besides financial reforms, a recent database by Ostry et al. (2009) includes information on structural reforms regarding the capital account, product markets (agriculture, telecommunications, and electricity), and trade (tariffs and the current account). Although economic liberalization in these markets might also be considered reform, we do not include them in the analysis. The regression results of Prati et al. (2013) and Christiansen et al. (2013) also indicate that agricultural market reforms, but not trade reforms, have positive association growth. However, in our sample, there are only 28 non-zero changes in the agricultural market liberalization index, as opposed to over 400 for financial reforms. Thus, reforms in the agriculture market as measured to do lend themselves to be analyzed with election cycles. Lastly, Aleksynska and Schindler (2011b) construct a database of labor market regulations. Replicating the baseline regressions from Prati et al. (2013) and Christiansen et al. (2013) with labor market reforms reveals that they do not appear to consistently affect output positively either. 24 The seven dimensions are: (i) credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements (including directed credit and credit ceilings), (ii) interest rate controls, (iii) entry barriers, (iv) state ownership in the banking sector, (v) capital account restrictions, (vi) prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector, and (vii) securities market policy. Each is assigned a liberalization score of 3, and an aggregate index is constructed by summing up all the categories.
25 Other sources for elections data with large coverage include the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) and Golder (2005) . There are some inconsistencies between the three sources on when elections occurred. Most of them are related to either governments being overthrown (e.g., coups), or a runoff election in the following year. We use the DPI as the main source of information, and make the following changes (which may or may not have been coding errors by the researchers) after: i) checking for consistency between election years with the variable "yrcurnt" (years left in current term), and ii) consulting with the two other data sources. Changes made: no executive elections in Madagascar, 1977, and Mexico, 1997; executive and legislative elections in Colombia, 1998 instead of 1999 , and in Kenya, 1988 instead of 1987 executive election in Zimbabwe in 1990. 26 Specifically, we utilize the variable "rgdpch", defined as PPP converted GDP per capita (chain series), at 2005 constant prices. nature of output generated as a result of effort on reforms, we construct an indicator variable for whether the growth rate of GDP per capita is above trend or not. Specifically, for each country, we use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to extract the trend component of GDP per capita, with a smoothing parameter of 100.
27 The variable Labovetrend is defined to be 1 if lagged GDP per capita is greater than the lagged trend value. Lastly, we also examine whether participation in an IMF loan program will have any effects on reform fatigue. Data on countries' historical lending arrangements with the IMF is downloaded from IMF's website. The dummy variable IM F is one if a country has an outstanding loan, yet to expire, from the IMF. 28 Appendix Table B .1 provides summary statistics for key variables.
Empirical results
We evaluate the relationship between financial market reforms and electoral cycles to provide empirical support for the two predictions of the model. We examine whether the annual change in financial reforms vary over the course of the electoral cycle with cross-national reduced-form regressions. The baseline estimation equation is:
where ∆Ref ct designates the first difference in the financial liberalization index Ref for a given country c and for a year t. The variable (Y ear of ) ct is equal to one if the country has an election in that year, and likewise, for the year after an election (Lag), and before (Lead). Fixed effects ϕ c and ϕ t capture unobserved heterogeneity that is country or year specific. Note the base group is the year(s) in between the lag and lead years. Thus, based on the model's prediction, an increase in the pace of reforms after an election would correspond to a positive sign on β 1 , while a slowdown in the pace of reforms prior to an election would correspond to a negative sign on β 3 . We estimate equation (8) using OLS. As argued earlier, election timing in presidential systems are determined by the constitution, and can be considered exogenous. In all specifications, we cluster the standard errors at the country level to account for potential serial correlation over time.
In Table 1 we examine reform fatigue cycles using the aggregate financial reform index.
27 The use of 100 as a smoothing parameter follows, for instance, Backus and Kehoe (1992) and Barro and Ursúa (2008) . However, our results robust to using a smoothing parameter of 400, chosen by, for example, Correia et al. (1992) and Cooley and Ohanian (1991) . Both 100 and 400 are commonly used (Ravn and Uhlig (2002) ).
28 Loans can be any of the following types: Exogenous Shock Facility, Extended Credit Facility, Extended Fund Facility, Flexible Credit Line, Precautionary and Liquidity Line, Precautionary and Liquidity Line, Standby Arrangement, Standby Credit Facility, and Structural Adjustment Facility Commitment. The first three columns consider the impact of executive and legislative elections together; the second three columns consider just executive elections; and the last three columns consider just legislative elections. Within each grouping, we include estimates of equation (8), which simultaneously includes the election year, the election lead and election lag. We also present additional estimates, looking separately at just the election lead or just the election lag. The base group in these specifications changes to all years in the electoral cycle not included as regressors.
The results present evidence of reform fatigue in financial reforms. The positive coefficient on the Lag variable indicates that financial reforms tend to be implemented faster after elections, while the negative coefficient on the Lead variable suggests that the liberalization of financial markets slows down in the run up to an election. These implied effects are substantial. The coefficient of 0.748 indicates that after an election, the pace of financial reforms increased by 36 percent relative to the mean change of 2.099. The coefficient of -0.670 implies that reforms slowed by 32 percent in the year before an election. Therefore, there is clearly a large difference in the speed of financial market liberalization between these two ends of the politician's term. This is also evident in the columns when one year if omitted; for example, when Lead is excluded, the coefficient on Lag becomes larger. The disaggregation of the legislative and executive elections suggest that the effects are not driven by either type of election, as the coefficients on the lead variables and lag variables across specifications are not statistically distinguishable from one another at the 5 percent level.
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In the Appendix (Table B. 3) we verify that the the cycle in reform fatigue is not exacerbated by IMF programs. Thus, reform fatigue does not appear to be driven by pressure from the international organization.
Finally, we assess whether financial reforms respond to output as predicted by the model and illustrated in Figure 5 . We focus on the interaction with the lead as this is where the model predicts we will likely find an effect. As Table 2 shows, the interaction of the election year lead with the (lag) above trend output variable is positive and significant. This indicates that the tendency to slow down reforms in the runup to the election is mitigated when lag output is relatively high. This dampening of the reform cycle is consistent with reforms continuing to increase in response to an initial success.
31

Conclusion
This paper presents a theory of reform fatigue. The theory is based on the voter's uncertainty about the competence of the politician. Success on reforms reflects a competent politician, whereas failure may result in the politician losing office. To slow the learning of the voter about the politician's own competence the politician reduces effort on the reform, which generates the observed reform fatigue. The model predicts that if the reform generates a success and the politician is competent, we should observed an increase in reforms.
The predictions of the model are supported by empirical evidence. A reform fatigue cycle is identified in financial reform data across countries. Furthermore, we show that this reform cycle does not appear to be significantly affected by participation in IMF programs, which refutes the conventional wisdom that this is due to the IMF. Rather, our theory suggests that these reform cycles are due to politicians optimally choosing to experiment with reforms under 29 The solutions of the Markov perfect equilibria proposed in Section 4 suggest that there should be no reform fatigue observed after the first success, i.e., x t is fixed at either 0 or 1. Consistent with this pattern, when we restrict the regression sample to politicians holding office for a second term or above (reducing the number of observations to 374 with 35 countries), we find a lack of support for any relationship between reforms and the electoral cycle.
30 In the Appendix Table B .2 we examine financial reforms in parliamentary regimes and demonstrate that there is no corresponding evidence of a cycle in this group of countries. These differing patterns are consistent with the fact that executives in parliamentary systems are not directly elected by voters, but rather by legislators with more information than voters. We have also examined sub-indices constructed by Giuliano et al. (2013) , which divide the financial reforms into domestic financial sector and capital account restrictions. These results also suggest that the effects are not driven by either type of financial reform, and are available upon request.
31 These results are robust to restricting the data to only first term or only re-election terms, to changing the smoothing parameter, and to using other methods to proxy for a "success" on reform. the shadow of electoral incentives. Finally, our empirical results show a positive correlation between output and reforms as predicted by the model when the politician is competent.
A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The voter will replace the politician only at time τ + ∆ τ when he is indifferent between firing the politician and keeping him one more instant. If the voter keeps the politician one more instant, with probability p ∆τ λ r there is a success on the reform and the politician puts full effort on reform thereafter, giving the voter a payoff 1 + λr r
. With probability (1 − p ∆τ )λ s there is a success on the status quo and the politician, who is still uncertain of his competence, pursues the optimal strategy given his belief q τ and delivers the payoff [1 + H(q τ )] to the voter. If there is no success, the voter strictly prefers to fire the politician and obtains the payoff λp r
. Thus the voter's indifference condition at time τ + ∆ τ is
Rearranging the voter's indifference condition gives
The last equality follows from equation (2), which gives the voter's belief p t at any time t after τ . This is evaluated at t = ∆ τ . Rearranging the last equality gives
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
After a first success on the reform at time τ , the politician exerts full effort on the reform in phase two of the equilibrium. If another success is obtained before time τ + ∆ τ , then the politician moves to phase three of the equilibrium in which he is kept forever and maintains full effort on the reform because he knows that he is good at that time. The voter's payoff in phase three is thus λr r
. The voter's payoff after a first success on the reform is thus
Simplifying, gives the ODE for V R t , which is −
The voter replaces the politician and time ∆ τ , and thus the boundary condition is V R ∆τ = λ p /r. Solving this ODE gives the continuation payoff for the voter if the politician got a first success on the reform and time τ . This is
After a first success on the status quo at time τ , the politician exerts full effort on the status quo in phase two of the equilibrium. As before, if another success is obtained before time ∆ τ , then the politician moves to phase three of the equilibrium in which he is kept forever and does the optimal experimentation for the voter, given that his belief that he is competent is q τ . The voter's payoff in phase three is thus H(q τ ). The voter's payoff after a first success on the status quo is thus
t with boundary condition V ∆τ = λ p /r. The continuation payoff for the voter at τ if the politician got a first success on the status quo at τ is thus
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Recall W t is the continuation payoff of the politician, at time t, who has not obtained any success by t. We get that W t is given by
where W R t and W S t are the politician's continuation payoffs after a success on the reform and status quo respectively. Since the politician is indifferent between the reform and the status quo, we can set x t = 0 in the above expression. Using the approximation that W t+dt = W t + dW t we have that W t evolves according to
If the politician achieves a success on the status quo at time t, then he has ∆ t units of time to obtain the second success. The politician will put full effort on the status quo during this time. If the second success is obtained before ∆ t , then the politician is retained permanently and receives discounted payoff e −r∆ t r . The probability that at least one success is obtained in the interval (t, t+∆ t ] is 1−e −λs∆t . The politician receives the payoff Notes: An observation for term length is one observed election cycle, i.e., election to election. Years up to first election observed in the sample are not counted as a term.
Labovetrend is equal to 1 if lagged GDP per capita is greater than the lagged trend value. IM F is equal to 1 if the country has an outstanding loan with the IMF.
B.2 Financial reforms in parliamentary regimes
We find no evidence of a political cycle in financial reforms in parliamentary systems. We present below in Table B .2 the regression for the parliamentary countries in a our dataset. Parliamentary regimes typically do not have an executive election that is separate from the legislative election, so we do not present results for executive elections only.
B.3 Reform Fatigue and the IMF
e consider whether financial reform cycles are influenced by participation in IMF programs. IMF programs are quite common in our sample, with just over half of the country year observations falling under such a program. In Table B .3 we present estimates interacting our election variables with an indicator for IMF program participation. The coefficient on the IMF participation variable is positive and significant as expected, however the coefficients on the interaction terms are insignificant across specifications. These results indicate that countries under IMF programs do in fact, implement financial reforms at a faster pace. However, they also show that the political cycle in reform fatigue is neither dampened nor exacerbated by program participation. Thus, reform fatigue appears to not be driven by external pressure from this international organization. Rather it is a broader phenomenon appearing among presidential countries more generally. 
